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RETURNING FAIRNESS 
TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
J. ROBERT BROWN, JR.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The paradigm shift in corporate governance over the last century has 
been the removal of categorical restrictions on the board of directors in 
favor of broad discretionary authority.1  With discretion, however, came 
risks.  Boards could use the authority to promote their own interests, rather 
than the interests of shareholders.  To limit this possibility, the law pur-
ported to subject directors to strict fiduciary obligations.  Discretion had to 
be exercised only in a manner that benefited shareholders.  In particular, the 
duty of loyalty triggered duties described as strict and unrelenting.2 
The approach is, however, a myth—at least today.  The discretion re-
mains, but the strict and unrelenting nature of fiduciary duties has not.  The 
duty of care evolved into a system of process, with form replacing sub-
stance.3  The duty of loyalty ceased to be about fairness.  Boards merely 
needed to show the presence of a majority of independent directors, a 
 
*Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; www.theracetothebottom 
.org.  Steve Bainbridge, Barbara Black, and Nancy Rapoport provided comments on a draft of this 
Article. 
1. An early example was the authority to issue new classes of shares so long as the authority 
existed in the articles.  The changes have included the right to buy votes and to discriminate 
against shareholders of the same class of stock.  See J. Robert Brown, Jr., Speaking with Complete 
Candor: Shareholder Ratification and the Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 
641, 644 n.12 (2003) (discussing examples of increases in board discretion at the expense of 
shareholders). 
2. Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939).  As the court in Guth stated: 
The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands 
that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.  The occasions for the 
determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and varied, and no 
hard and fast rule can be formulated.  The standard of loyalty is measured by no fixed 
scale. 
Id. at 510. 
3. J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty without Limits: “Independent” Directors and the 
Elimination of the Duty of Loyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 57 (2006-07).  Any residual content to the duty 
of care was eliminated with the universal adoption of waiver of liability provisions.  See J. Robert 
Brown, Jr. & Sandeep Gopalan, Opting Only In: Contractarians, Waiver of Liability Provisions, 
and the Race to the Bottom, University of Denver Legal Studies Research Paper No. 08-02 (2008), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1087404 (discussing the provi-
sions and their impact on fiduciary obligations). 
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standard largely rendered meaningless through judicial legerdemain.  Fair-
ness, in short, was reduced to a rote head count.4 
The result has been unchecked discretion.  Moreover, the discretion is 
not exercised randomly.  Boards are typically “captured” by top officers, 
particularly the CEO.5  Board authority is often better described as exer-
cised in the best interests of management rather than shareholders.6  This 
can be seen most clearly in the context of executive compensation, where 
amounts paid to top officers have continued to escalate upward in an out-of-
control fashion.7 
Some portions of the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act 
(NDPTCA/Act) address this problem.8  The Act attempts to reduce capture 
by enhancing the ability of shareholders to elect their own candidates to the 
board.  The Act limits advance notice bylaws9 and allows large share-
holders access to the company’s proxy statement for their nominees.10  
Shareholders have the right to mandatory repayment of proxy expenses 
when their candidates are elected.11 
The provisions in the NDPTCA, however, are modest and unlikely to 
result in significant change to board composition.  For the foreseeable 
future, boards of public companies, including those incorporated under the 
NDPTCA, will remain captured by management.  As a result, it leaves in 
place a system of broad board discretion and weak fiduciary principals that 
do not adequately protect the interests of shareholders.12 
 
4. See Brown, supra note 3, at 62; see also infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
5. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:  PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 51-68 (2008) (discussing ways in which a CEO “captures” the board of directors). 
6. See, e.g., The Financial Crisis and the Role of Federal Regulators: Hearing Before the H. 
Comm. On Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. (2008) (statement by Alan Greenspan) (“I 
made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organizations, specifically banks and others, 
were such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the 
firms.”).  Managerial self interest could sometimes benefit shareholders, particularly by providing 
an incentive to maintain share prices in the short term, but as the recent turmoil in the financial 
markets illustrates, reliance on management self interest to protect shareholders has failed 
dismally.  Id. 
7. See Joann S. Lublin, Persistent Pay Gains:  A Survey Overview, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 
2008, at R1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120793930504508449.html?mod=2_ 
1565_leftbox (study of compensation paid to CEOs). 
8. N.D. CENT. CODE Ch. 10-35 (2007). 
9. See id. § 10-35-07 (limiting advance notice bylaw to no longer than ninety days). 
10. See id. § 10-35-02(8) (defining “qualified shareholder” as also including a two-year 
holding period for the shares). 
11. Id. § 10-35-10.  This is particularly important given the Delaware Supreme Court’s 
decision in CA, Inc. v. AFSCME Employees Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227 (Del. 2008). 
12. See J. Robert Brown, The North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act and the 
Delaware Advantage, July 6, 2007, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/shareholder-rights/the-
north-dakota-publicly-traded-corporations-act-and-the-de.html?SSScrollPosition=0 (noting the 
failure of the NDPTCA to address fiduciary obligations of directors).  Of course, the interests of 
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This Article explores the demise of fiduciary obligations, emphasizing 
executive compensation.  Part II examines the duty of loyalty and the tradi-
tional interpretation accorded by the courts.  Part III discusses the eviscera-
tion of the duty, particularly the replacement of fairness analysis with the 
business judgment rule.  Process, as this Article will show, has proved an 
inadequate substitute for fairness.  Finally, Part IV proposes a solution. 
II. DECLINE OF THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
In the early days of corporate law, courts considered the risks asso-
ciated with self-dealing by officers and directors so great that they treated 
the transactions as voidable.13  Excessively narrow, the approach threatened 
to prevent a class of transactions that could often benefit the corporation.  In 
response, courts gradually opted for a less restrictive test allowing the 
transactions, but only if substantively and procedurally fair.14  Procedural 
fairness meant approval by shareholders or disinterested directors.15  By the 
mid-twentieth century, however, it was enough to show substantive fairness 
irrespective of the process used,16 although the burden remained with the 
board.17 
 
shareholders may themselves be fragmented.  See Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About 
Increasing Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. REV. 561, 577 (2006).  The point is a fair one but 
largely beyond the scope of this Article.  Whatever differences may exist among shareholders, the 
need to determine executive compensation in a manner that is designed to be fair would likely be a 
widely shared view. 
13. Brown, supra note 3, at 54; see also Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) (“At 
common law, a corporation’s stockholders did have the power to nullify an interested transaction, 
although considerations of the transaction’s fairness appear to have played some part in judicial 
decisions applying this rule.”) (internal citations omitted).  Not everyone agrees with this early 
characterization.  See generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director’s Fiduciary 
Duty of Loyalty:  Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 
655, 659-62 (1992) (asserting that interested director contracts were not always voidable); see also 
Norwood P. Beveridge, Interested Director Contracts at Common Law:  Validation Under the 
Doctrine of Constructive Fraud, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 97, 98-99 (1999) (noting that Professor 
Marsh’s assertion has come under attack). 
14. The voidable nature of the contracts lasted until the 1960s, when many states adopted 
statutes that clarified their legality.  Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?  Conflict of 
Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 BUS. LAW. 35, 36 (1966).  If either substantively fair or 
approved through the proper process, the transactions would cease to be voidable.  That did not 
mean, however, that the transactions were otherwise consistent with a board’s fiduciary 
obligations. 
15. Id. at 39-40. 
[T]he general rule was that a contract between a director and his corporation was valid 
if it was approved by a disinterested majority of his fellow directors and was not found 
to be unfair or fraudulent by the court if challenged; but that a contract in which a 
majority of the board was interested was voidable at the instance of the corporation or 
its shareholders without regard to any question of fairness. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
16. See Harvey Gelb, Corporate Governance and the Independence Myth, 6 WYO. L. REV. 
129, 130-31 (2006) (“The general rule by the mid-twentieth century would uphold the validity of a 
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Substantive fairness in many cases amounted to a straightforward 
approach.  The board had to show that the conflict of interest transaction 
retained the “the earmarks of an arm’s length bargain.”18  In other words, 
the transaction could be no more favorable than what would have been 
negotiated with anyone devoid of the conflict.  To establish fairness, boards 
could look to reliable markets that provided a neutral and arms length price 
or rely on a history of comparable transactions and payments.19 
Fairness, however, was not always so easily determined.  Some trans-
actions had a unique price and were not susceptible to analysis under the 
traditional tests.20  In those circumstances, the courts developed a relatively 
complex approach that necessitated examination of the whole transaction.21  
Appropriately labeled “entire fairness,” the review took into account the 
factors and the method used to determine price.22  Specifically, fair price 
required examination of “the economic and financial considerations” relied 
 
transaction even in the absence of a disinterested director majority vote unless it was found by the 
court to be unfair to the corporation.”). 
17. See Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1222 (Del. 1999) (“Once the entire 
fairness standard has been implicated, as here, the defendants, at least initially, bear the burden of 
demonstrating the two basic aspects of fair dealing and fair price.”) (internal citation omitted); 
Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (“When faced with 
such divided loyalties, directors have the burden of establishing the entire fairness of the 
transaction to survive careful scrutiny by the courts.”); Keenan v. Eshleman, 2 A.2d 904, 
908 (Del. 1938) (“In the second place, dealing as they did with another corporation of which they 
were sole directors and officers, they assumed the burden of showing the entire fairness of the 
transaction.”). 
18. Byelick v. Vivadelli, 79 F. Supp. 2d 610, 629 (E.D. Va. 1999) (quoting Moneta v. 
Willard Building Supply Co., 515 S.E.2d 277, 287 (Va. 1999)).  As one commentator noted, 
fairness represented what “would have been approved by a disinterested board negotiating at 
arm’s length with a stranger.”  Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1, 7 
(1993). 
19. See Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 750 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“The price terms 
obviously cannot be justified by reference to any reliable market.  Nor is there proof in the record 
of substantial comparable transactions to which the court might look to find support for the 
payment of bonuses of this size.”). 
20. This is particularly true in the context of mergers between companies and their 
controlling shareholders.  See Emerald, 787 A.2d at 94-95. 
21. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1179 (Del. 1995) (“Rather, it is a 
standard by which the Court of Chancery must carefully analyze the factual circumstances, apply 
a disciplined balancing test to its findings, and articulate the bases upon which it decides the 
ultimate question of entire fairness.  In some instances, however, price may predominate.”); see 
also In re TD Banknorth S’holders Litig., 938 A.2d 654, 667 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Equally 
fundamental is the notion that fair price and fair dealing are not viewed in isolation,’ but rather in 
conjunction, and that fairness as to one prong will not necessarily sterilize a transaction or 
immunize a defendant from liability.”). 
22. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1163 (“In this case, because the contested action is the sale of a 
company, the ‘fair price’ aspect of an entire fairness analysis requires the board of directors to 
demonstrate ‘that the price offered was the highest value reasonably available under the 
circumstances.’”). 
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upon by the board.23  Fair dealing, in turn, “embrace[d] questions of when 
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, 
disclosed to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and the 
stockholders were obtained.”24 
An objective test, neither prong entirely controlled the analysis.25  
Nonetheless, as a practical matter, process was a less important component.  
Fair process was only relevant to the extent it related to the fairness (or 
unfairness) of the price.26  Even with a flawed process, the amount paid 
could still be fair.27 
Executive compensation implicates the duty of loyalty and the 
obligation of fairness.  In almost all large public companies, the CEO sits 
on the board and is in a position to influence the amount authorized.28  The 
presence of the interested influence imposes on the board the obligation of  
showing fairness.  Two recent Delaware cases illustrate the application of  
the entire fairness standard in the context of executive compensation. 
 
23. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, 921 A.2d at 746 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 
711 (Del. 1983)).  Fair dealing could demonstrate fair price.  Id. 
24. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 710. 
25. Entire fairness requires a review of “all aspects” of the transaction.  See In re TD, 938 
A.2d at 667 (“Equally fundamental is the notion that fair price and fair dealing are not viewed in 
isolation, but rather in conjunction, and that fairness as to one prong will not necessarily sterilize a 
transaction or immunize a defendant from liability.”); see also Int’l Telecharge, Inc. v. Bomarko, 
Inc., 766 A.2d 437, 440 (Del. 2000) (determining entire fairness “without focusing on one 
component over another”). 
26. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, 921 A.2d at 746.  Fair dealing “informs the court as to the fairness 
of the price obtained through that process.”  Id. 
27. See id. at 748 (“It is possible that the pricing terms were so fair as to render the 
transaction entirely fair.”).  See also Oliver v. Boston Univ., No. 16570-NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
75, at *25 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2007). 
[T]hus, the only harm suffered by the Plaintiffs was a procedural one.  Therefore, 
although the BU Defendants did breach their duty of loyalty and were unable to 
demonstrate the entire fairness of the Series B and C transactions, for purposes of 
assessing the fiduciaries’ treatment of these claims in the context of negotiating the 
Accord Agreement, the Court does not find it appropriate to assign anything but 
nominal damages to these breaches. 
Id.  Thus, in Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1287 (Del. 1989), the Delaware 
Supreme Court indicated that a board’s obligations under Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes 
Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1985) could be met where “the directors possess a body of reliable 
evidence with which to evaluate the fairness of a transaction.”  Oliver, No. 16570-NC, 2006 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 75, at *25.  In those circumstances, they “may approve that transaction without 
conducting an active survey of the market.”  Id. 
28. SHEARMAN & STERLING LLP, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND COMPENSATION SURVEY 
26 (2008).  The presence on the board enables the CEO to influence the compensation process.   
Nonetheless, this does not necessarily mean that the CEO in fact always exercises that authority.  
See Steven M. Bainbridge, Executive Compensation:  Who Decides?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 
1642-43 (2005) (“At the same time, however, their more ambitious claim that managerial power is 
‘pervasive,’ and thus broadly explanatory of executive compensation practices remains 
contested.”). 
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Julian v. Eastern States Development29 involved a dispute among three 
brothers conducting business together.30  Two sat on the board of Bench-
mark and, after a meeting of “less than a half an hour” attended by “no legal 
or financial advisors,” they voted themselves substantial bonuses.31  In the 
ensuing litigation, the directors had the burden of showing the fairness of 
the payments.32 
The directors argued that bonuses were ordinary and that the amounts 
were in return for the company’s “good year.”33  The court conceded a pre-
existing practice of paying bonuses but viewed the amounts as uncharac-
teristically large.34  The court found that: 
From 1999 through 2004, [Company’s] bonuses as a percentage of 
adjusted income hovered between 3.30% and 3.36%.  In contrast, 
the challenged 2005 bonuses constituted 22.28% of adjusted 
income.  Additionally, 2005 marked the first time [the non-brother 
director] received a bonus beyond the performance-based compen-
sation set forth in his Employment Agreement.35 
These amounts were not sufficiently explained by the company’s “good 
year.”36  “Regarding the reward for a good year, Benchmark had a better 
year in 2004 than 2005, and the bonuses in 2004 were still only 3.36% of 
adjusted income.”37  The court held that the board had not met its burden of 
showing fairness.38 
 
29. No. 1892-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2008). 
30. Julian, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, at *1. 
31. Id. at *5. 
32. Id. at *17.  Without a majority of independent directors, the board retained the burden of 
establishing fairness.  Had there been a majority, the court would have reviewed the bonuses 
under the duty of care. 
33. Id. at *5. 
34. Id. at *19. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id.  See J. Robert Brown, Pangloss, Delaware Law, and the Duty of Loyalty:  Julian v. 
Eastern States Development Co., Aug. 25, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-
of-delaware-law/pangloss-delaware-law-and-the-duty-of-loyalty-julian-v-easte.html (discussing 
Julian). 
38. The court also indicated concern with process.  Julian, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *18. 
The circumstances of the Benchmark Bonuses give rise to suspicion about their fair-
ness.  Eleven days after Gene submitted his letter of retirement and resignation from 
ESDC and ESCS, the Benchmark board approved the Benchmark Bonuses.  Francis 
initiated the process just days after Gene’s notice of retirement.  He approached 
Richard before the December 20, 2005 [,] board meeting and proposed making the 
bonuses.  The brothers discussed the concept for fifteen minutes, and consulted no one 
else.  Francis and Richard concede that they knew any bonus would decrease the net 
book value of Benchmark, consequently decreasing the value of the shares they 
contemporaneously were trying to force Gene to sell back. 
Id. 
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Similarly, in Valeant Pharmaceuticals International v. Jerney,39 the 
board of ICN Pharmaceuticals, Inc. voted to pay its directors large bonuses 
in connection with a corporate restructuring.40  ICN earned a substantial 
portion of its earnings from royalties on the sale of Ribavirin, an antiviral 
drug.41  Following pressure from an activist shareholder, the board opted to 
spin off the Ribavirin assets and scheduled an initial public offering (IPO) 
for the subsidiary.42  Estimates indicated that the offering would yield a 
market value for the subsidiary of between $2.25 billion and $3 billion.43  In 
fact, the IPO proved less successful than anticipated, with the market value 
at approximately half that amount.44 
The compensation committee authorized bonuses for the responsible 
officers and directors totaling more than $50 million.45  Problems existed 
with both the process and the factors used to compute the bonuses.46  It was 
the CEO, rather than the committee, who largely determined the size of the 
bonus pool.47  The compensation consultant was chosen by the board48 and 
employed what turned out to be incorrect valuations.49  Finally, the 
directors on the committee shared in the bonuses and, during the same 
 
39. 921 A.2d 732 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
40. Valeant Pharms. Int’l, 921 A.2d at 735. 
41. Id. at 736. 
42. Id. at 737. 
43. Id. at 737-38. 
44. Id. at 738.  The second step spinoff never occurred.  ICN eventually repurchased the 
shares sold in the IPO through a $6.25 per share tender offer.  Id. at 742. 
45. Id. at 738.  In addition, two of the three directors had ties to the CEO.  Id. 
46. Id. at 739.  “Self-interested compensation decisions made without independent protec-
tions are subject to the same entire fairness review as any other interested transaction.”  Id. at 745. 
47. Id. at 746-47.  The court described the process as “designed simply to justify a predeter-
mined outcome.”  Id.  at 747; see also id. at 748-49. 
The committee did not examine afresh the question of whether any bonus arrangement 
was appropriate and, if so, how much and what form of bonus to award.  This can be 
seen in the April 2 meeting minutes where the committee began their consideration by 
discussing ‘[t]he question of what rationale is appropriate to support the award . . . .’ 
The other minutes are replete with suggestions by Moses, in particular, of possible 
explanations both for awarding sizeable bonuses and for paying a large portion of any 
award to Panic. 
Id. 
48. Id. at 739.  The report also did not consider certain other recent compensation studies 
performed for ICN.  These studies, relied on by the plaintiff, indicated that the CEO’s total direct 
compensation was twenty-seven percent higher than the 75th percentile and fifty-one percent 
higher than the median among CEOs in ICN’s peer group.  Id. at 740-41. 
49. Id.  “Finally, and perhaps most perniciously, the board, the compensation committee, and 
outside experts were given and relied on inflated and misleading information provided by 
management led by a recalcitrant CEO who stood to benefit most from the transaction.”  Id. at 
748. 
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period, were negotiating with the CEO over future consulting 
arrangements.50 
Problems likewise existed with the factors used to calculate the 
bonuses.51  ICN had a history of incentive payments for “extraordinary 
transactions.”52  The restructuring bonuses were, however, unusually 
large.53  They were computed using what turned out to be wildly inaccurate 
valuations.54  Neither the board nor the compensation consultant could point 
to similar sized bonuses in comparable transactions.55 
The board was unable to point to any source of value that justified the 
payments.56  According to the court: 
Thus, the bonuses were awarded essentially for taking the biggest 
piece of an already public company and reissuing it as a new 
public stock.  Moreover, the bonuses in question were being paid 
to parent company managers who would have no further involve-
ment in the “spun” company.  When viewed from this perspective, 
it is difficult to see how such large bonuses could be justified.  
Thus, it is not surprising that Towers Perrin was unable to find 
comparable grant data.57 
The court, therefore, found that the board had not met its burden of showing 
fairness.58 
Both Valeant and Julian illustrate the salutary benefit of applying the 
entire fairness standard to compensation decisions.  The approach imposed 
modest but meaningful limits on board discretion.  In both cases, the courts 
had no objection to the payment of bonuses.  They merely required that the 
board show consistency with past practice or provide a reasonable 
 
50. Id. at 747. 
51. Id. at 749.  Even with unfair process, the price still could have been fair.  See id. at 748 
(“The court’s finding that ICN’s management and board used an unfair process to authorize the 
bonuses does not end the court’s inquiry because it is possible that the pricing terms were so fair 
as to render the transaction entirely fair.”). 
52. Id. at 749. 
53. Id. at 750. 
54. Id.  The use of the $3 billion valuation alone made “the bonuses not entirely fair.”  Id. 
55. Id.  The next day, UBS told ICN that the IPO would have to be re-priced to $10 per 
share.  Id.  Panic was advised by two Fried Frank lawyers to have the board revisit the bonus 
scheme authorization in light of the change in pricing.  Id.  Panic ignored this advice.  Id. Al-
though the board met to authorize the IPO pricing, it never reconsidered the amount of the bonus 
award.  Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id.; see also id. at 749 (“Thus, while some bonus might have been appropriate, the 
amount of the bonus should have been calculated with reference to the value added to ICN by the 
IPO and spin-off and not the total value of Ribavirin or other assets contributed by ICN to 
Ribapharm.”). 
58. Id. at 750. 
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explanation for any deviation, something both were unable to do.  In other 
words, in those two cases, entire fairness merely prevented the payment of 
executive compensation that lacked the discipline of a contemporaneous 
justification. 
III. ELIMINATION OF FAIRNESS FROM THE DUTY OF LOYALTY 
Julian and Valeant are, unfortunately, unusual cases.  Compensation 
and other conflict of interest transactions rarely receive the scrutiny of 
entire fairness.  The mild obligation for boards to justify unusually large 
compensation awards is not typically part of the analysis.  Instead, the 
Delaware courts extend to compensation decisions the absolute protection 
of the business judgment rule.59  The standard makes the substantive terms 
essentially irrelevant.  The number of options, the amount of salary, and the 
size of the bonuses are not generally part of the analysis.60  Instead, the 
matter turns on the number of “independent” directors on the board. 
The Delaware courts came to this position through legerdemain.  The 
business judgment rule represents an over-inclusive protection designed to 
protect risk taking by directors.61  Boards know that even if they take risks 
that prove in hindsight to be mistaken and harmful, they will escape 
liability.  The presumption is not, however, designed to protect decisions 
motivated by a conflict of interest.62 
The Delaware courts avoided this traditional approach largely by 
ignoring the existence of the conflict of interest in the decision-making 
process.63  Without any real analysis, they extended the presumption of the 
business judgment rule to boards containing a majority of independent 
directors.64  It was as if the presence of this majority caused the taint of the 
 
59. The halcyon days of Van Gorkom—when there was at least some possibility that the 
Delaware courts would accord content to the business judgment rule—are over.  See In re Walt 
Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, passim (Del. 2008).  Moreover, waiver of liability has 
all but eliminated any remaining vestiges of the duty of care.  See Brown & Gopalan, supra note 3 
at 3, 11 n.38. 
60. One need only look to Disney to see how the case turned not on the $160 million 
awarded to Michael Ovitz but on the process used by the compensation committee and the board 
in approving the contract.  See In re Walt Disney Co., 906 A.2d at 37-41, 51-55. 
61. Brown, supra note 3, at 55. 
62. See Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980) (“But the business 
judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of interest.”). 
63. Hokanson v. Petty, No. 3438-VCS, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 182  (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 2008); 
see also Eliminating Fairness from the Duty of Loyalty:  Hokanson v. Petty (2009), 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/eliminating-fairness-from-the-duty-of-loyalty-
hokanson-v-pet.html (discussing the presence of conflicts of interest in the decision-making 
process). 
64. The courts have left open the possibility that a plaintiff can show that an interested party 
actually exercised control over independent directors.  See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
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conflict to dissipate.  The courts, however, did not accompany the extension 
with any obligation to eliminate65 or quarantine the interested influence.66  
Indeed, the business judgment rule applied even if the interested directors 
participated in the decision and voted on the final outcome.67 
There are many problems with this approach.  First, it makes a 
mockery of the underlying rationale for the business judgment rule.  By 
leaving the conflict in the decision-making process, the Delaware courts 
have extended the over-inclusive presumption beyond the traditional goal of 
protecting risk taking to encompass decisions motivated by a conflict of 
 
663 A.2d 1156, 1170 n.25 (Del. 1995) (“Similarly, the manipulation of the disinterested majority 
by an interested director vitiates the majority’s ability to act as a neutral decision-making body.”) 
(internal citation omitted); Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 364 (Del. 1993) (“We 
agree with defendants that the question of when director self-interest translates into board 
disloyalty is a fact-dominated question, the answer to which will necessarily vary from case to 
case.”).  Given obvious difficulties in proof and heightened pleading standards, this rarely occurs.  
See In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 179 (Del Ch. 2005) (refusing to 
dismiss a suit against individual directors in which plaintiff made allegations that the controlling 
shareholders negotiated the terms of the merger). 
65. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 366 n.35 (“Examples of techniques which can restrict the 
influence an interested director may exert include: recusal of the interested director(s) from 
participation in board meetings.”) (internal citations omitted). 
66. A disinterested and independent committee would be one possible mechanism for 
quarantining a conflict of interest.  This has been the approach used, for example, in the context of 
board consideration of derivative suits.  See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 
1981). 
We do not think that the interest taint of the board majority is per se a legal bar to the 
delegation of the board’s power to an independent committee composed of 
disinterested board members.  The committee can properly act for the corporation to 
move to dismiss derivative litigation that is believed to be detrimental to the 
corporation’s best interest. 
Id.  Whether the conflict could ever be eliminated, even with a rigorous quarantine, remains an 
open question.  See Marsh, supra note 14, at 37-38 (discussing an early case that found it 
“impossible to measure the influence” of interested directors on the board and, as a result, courts 
gave little weight to disinterested approval).  Delaware, however, has rejected this view.  See Cede 
& Co., 634 A.2d at 363. 
This Court has never held that one director’s colorable interest in a challenged 
transaction is sufficient, without more, to deprive a board of the protection of the 
business judgment rule presumption of loyalty.  Provided that the terms of 8 Del.C. 
§ 144 are met, self-interest, alone, is not a disqualifying factor even for a director. 
Id. 
67. See Brown, supra note 3, at 55; see also E. Norman Veasey and Christine T. Di 
Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can a Director Serve? A Look at the Tensions Facing 
Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761 n. 40 (2008).  Whatever the source, the courts seem to 
view majority independent boards as having cleansed the “taint” of the conflict of interest, but the 
standard does no such thing.  There is no Delaware court that requires quarantine of the conflict of 
interest.  Directors with the conflict can participate in the debate and even vote on the matter.  See 
Nebenzahl v. Miller, No. 13206, 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *10-11 (Del. Ch. Aug. 26, 1996) 
(“Compliance with Section 144 provides the protection of the business judgment rule and removes 
the taint of director self-interest in a transaction.”); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 365 (“Section 
144(a)(1) appears to be a legislative mandate that, under such circumstances, an approving vote of 
a majority of informed and disinterested directors shall remove any taint of director or directors’ 
self-interest in a transaction.”). 
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interest.  The mere presence of a majority of “independent” directors in no 
way establishes that the decision was unaffected by the interested 
influence.68 
Second, whatever benefits flow from the presence of independent 
directors, the Delaware courts have done little to ensure that directors are in 
fact independent.  They routinely ignore facts that suggest a lack of inde-
pendence, employing excessive pleading standards and inconsistent tests.69  
The courts categorically decline to consider relationships arising from struc-
tural bias and largely ignore friendship as a basis for finding a disqualifying 
relationship.70  Boards characterized as independent, therefore, may in fact 
have a majority of directors subject to the control and influence of the CEO. 
Third, the business judgment rule requires that directors be informed.71  
A growing body of evidence suggests that, in the context of executive com-
pensation, the decisions are uninformed.  To support compensation deci-
sions, boards (or compensation committees) typically rely on reports from 
consultants.72  Compensation consultants often are not neutral, independent 
advisors, but advocates for the CEO.  In those circumstances, their role may 
be less about fairness and more about providing a post hoc justification for 
 
68. Said another way, the independent directors are not hermetically sealed from the 
interested directors.  See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs & Leo E. Strine, Jr., Function Over 
Form:  A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 
1287, 1308 (2001). 
[A]lthough most public company boards have a majority of independent directors, 
those directors are not hermetically sealed off from the inside directors. It is 
commonplace for outside directors to have social, and in some cases business, 
relationships (e.g., a partner in the company’s outside law firm or investment bank 
serving as a director). 
Id. 
69. Delaware courts use a subjective standard but typically refuse to allow plaintiffs to use 
discovery to explore each director’s unique circumstances with respect to independence. 
70. This type of “structural bias” has been summarily rejected by the Delaware Supreme 
Court.  See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (characterizing arguments based 
upon “structural bias” as presupposing that “the professional and social relationships that naturally 
develop among members of a board impede independent decision-making.”).  Foreign regulators, 
however, take a different view and often specify that a director loses his or her independence after 
a particular number of years on the board of directors. 
71. See Smith v. Van Gorkam, 488 A.2d 858, 885-88 (Del. 1985) (discussing the facts relied 
upon by trial courts in finding boards of directors made informed business judgments). 
72. According to one report, 207 out of the Fortune 250 used compensation consultants in 
2006.  STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM, EXECUTIVE 
PAY:  CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AMONG COMPENSATION CONSULTANTS 7 (Comm. Print 2007), 
available at http://oversight.house.gov/documents/20071205100928.pdf [hereinafter EXECUTIVE 
PAY]; see also Brian D. Cadman, Mary Ellen Carter & Stephen A. Hillegeist, The Role and Effect 
of Compensation Consultants on CEO Pay (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1103682 (noting that 86% of 880 companies studied used 
compensation consultants). 
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predetermined amounts of compensation.73  In addition, they may have 
other business relationships with the company that impairs neutrality.  As 
one study of compensation practices noted: 
The concern arises from the fact that many compensation con-
sultants work for diversified human resources consulting firms that 
have developed strong ties to management by providing other non-
compensation-related services to their corporate clients, including 
actuarial services, information technology services, risk manage-
ment and insurance underwriting, health and welfare services, tax 
and legal advice and outsourcing.  The fees earned for these ser-
vices are often significantly higher than the fees earned for execu-
tive compensation consulting services provided to the compensa-
tion committee.74 
Hearings in Congress on the role of compensation consultants pro-
duced a report suggesting wide spread conflicts of interest.  According to 
the Committee Report:  “The fees earned by compensation consultants for 
providing other services often far exceed those earned for advising on exe-
cutive compensation.”75  At the same time, over two-thirds of the Fortune 
250 companies analyzed in one study hired compensation consultants with 
conflicts of interest and did not disclose the conflicts in their SEC filings.76 
Yet companies need not disclose the reports or significant information 
about their relationship with the consultants, including possible conflicts of 
interest.77  Similarly, companies have no obligation to reveal the CEO’s role 
 
73. The court in Valeant stated that the role of the compensation consultant was to “justify a 
predetermined outcome.”  Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 748 (Del. 2007).  
Similarly, this seemed to be the case at Countrywide.  See William Garehime, Congress, CEO Pay 
and the Use of Compensation Consultants, Mar. 17, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/ 
executive-comp/2008/3/17/congress-ceo-pay-and-the-use-of-compensation-consultants.html 
(discussing how the CEO of Countrywide used the consultant to achieve “maximum oppor-
tunity”). 
74. SHEARMAN & STERLING, supra note 28, at 10.  The Shearman and Sterling report noted 
that only a small number of companies have adopted a policy requiring compensation consultant 
independence, including Wachovia Corporation, The Procter & Gamble Company, Pfizer, Inc., 
Sprint Nextel Corporation, The Home Depot, Inc., and Verizon Communications Inc. Id. at 13. 
75. See EXECUTIVE PAY, supra note 72, at i; See also SHEARMAN & STERLING, supra note 
28, at 12  (“The fees earned by  compensation consultants for ‘other services’ often far exceeded 
fees earned for compensation consulting. In 2006, consultants received fees for ‘other services’ 
($2.3 million) from each client that were more than ten times greater than fees for executive 
compensation consulting services ($220,000)”). 
76. See EXECUTIVE PAY, supra note 72, at i-ii.  The report concluded that there “appears to 
be a correlation between the extent of a consultant’s conflict of interest and the level of CEO pay.”  
Id. at ii. 
77. 17 CFR § 229.407(e) (2007).  Item 407(e) of Regulation S-K. Companies must disclose 
the role of the compensation consultant: 
[I]n determining or recommending the amount or form of executive and director 
compensation, identify such consultants and state whether such consultants are 
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in selecting the firm.78  It is shareholders that have the burden of demon-
strating the uninformed nature of the decision.  The shareholders must do so 
without affirmative disclosure by companies or the benefit of discovery.79  
In other words, the compensation decision may well be uninformed but 
pleading burdens prevent adequate exploration of the issue. 
How this works in practice can be seen from the analysis in Valeant.  
Because of the unusual application of the entire fairness standard, the board, 
rather than shareholders, retained the burden.80  As a result, the discovery 
process uncovered substantial problems with the method of selecting the 
consultant and the consultant’s report.81  The consultant had largely been 
foisted on the committee82 and relied on data that ultimately proved to be 
wildly inaccurate.83  A discussion draft was apparently shown to manage-
ment before the compensation committee, resulting in changes.84  The 
report’s conclusions about the compensation paid to the CEO of ICN did 
 
engaged directly by the compensation committee  or any other person; and describe 
the nature and scope of their assignment, and the material elements of the instructions 
or directions given to the consultants with respect to the performance of their duties 
under the engagement. 
Id. 
78. There is no requirement to disclose the method used to select the consultant, including 
the CEO’s role in the process.  Indeed, in adopting the requirement, the SEC deleted a requirement 
that would have required companies to identify “the executive officers of the company that the 
compensation consultants contacted in carrying out their assignment.”  Exchange Act Release No. 
54302A (August 29, 2006).  This requirement would have at least put into the public domain 
information about the CEO’s contacts with the consultant.  
79. In narrow circumstances, shareholders may be able to obtain the materials through an 
exercise of inspection rights.  The standards, however, are high and the costs significant.  See 
Cronin v. AmBase Corp., No. 342-N, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at *15-17 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 
2005) (discussing a narrow set of circumstances in which the plaintiffs were able to inspect a 
corporations books and records). 
80. Valeant Pharms. Int’l v. Jerney, 921 A.2d 732, 740 (Del. 2007). 
81. Id. 
82. See id. at 739-40 (noting that one ICN executive noted that the consultant “had looked 
specifically at this issue and determined it was justified in this instance”).  Indeed, language in the 
opinion suggested that the consultant had prejudged the bonus issue.  Id. 
83. Id. at 737.  The consultant relied on a $3 billion market value.  Id.  The ultimate value 
was about half that amount.  Id.  When the true value was ascertained, lawyers for the CEO 
recommended that the board reconsider the bonuses.  See id. at 739-40 (“[The CEO] was advised 
by two Fried Frank lawyers to have the board revisit the bonus scheme authorization in light of the 
change in pricing.  [The CEO] ignored this advice.  Although the board met to authorize the IPO 
pricing, it never reconsidered the amount of the bonus award.”). 
84. Id. at n.9. 
Interestingly, an April 5, 2002 discussion draft of the Towers Perrin report, apparently 
shared with management but not with the compensation committee, suggested a 
reduction in the proposed grant to [the CEO] from 5 million to 3 million options.  This 
suggestion led to a meeting . . . at which [the CEO] described his contributions to the 
success of ICN and Ribavirin, in particular.  The final [consultant] report supports and 
award to [the CEO] at the [$]5 million option level. 
Id. 
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not take into account his recently amended compensation agreement.85  Had 
shareholders retained the burden, much of this information would never 
have become available and the opinion of the compensation consultant 
would have been entitled to deference. 
IV. RETURNING FAIRNESS TO EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
Where does this leave executive compensation?  Because of the 
approach taken by the Delaware courts, entire fairness is rarely used in 
assessing compensation decisions.  Entire fairness is not an onerous burden, 
at least in the compensation context.  As Julian and Valeant illustrate, 
fairness merely requires the board to justify its decision.86  Fairness could 
be established by reference to a reliable market (perhaps a study of peer 
companies) or a meaningful explanation of the value added by the CEO or 
other relevant officer. 
Even this modest standard, however, has been eliminated and replaced 
by the process-driven business judgment rule.  The business judgment rule 
leaves the burden on shareholders.  It is shareholders that must somehow 
show a flawed decision making process by the board, and must do so with-
out adequate disclosure or discovery.  In other words, findings that directors 
are independent and informed are less a product of examination of what 
actually happened inside the boardroom than denial of access to the 
information that shareholders need to address the issue. 
In these circumstances, shareholders are wholly unprotected from self-
serving behavior.  Boards need not establish fairness.  They need not justify 
their decisions.  Indeed, had this standard been applied to the bonuses in 
Julian and Valeant, both would have been upheld.  The main concern of the 
courts in the two cases was the amount of the bonus.  Amount is irrelevant 
 
85. Id. at 740. 
[The compensation report] reviewed past compensation practices of the company.  The 
report concludes that the compensation for the company’s executives, specifically [the 
CEO], was within the median range of similarly situated executives.  However, the 
report did not consider [the CEO’s] recently amended compensation agreements.  The 
report also did not consider certain other recent compensation studies performed for 
ICN.  These studies, relied on by the plaintiff, indicate Panic’s total direct compen-
sation was 27% higher than the 75th percentile and 51% higher than the median 
among CEOs in ICN’s peer group. 
Id. 
86. See id. at 746-51; Julian v. Eastern States Dev., No. 1892-VCP, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 86, 
at *58 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2008) (“The record indicates no coherent, credible reason for the bonuses 
other than in reaction to Gene's retirement.”) 
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when determining the availability of the business judgment rule.  The 
effective result is compensation without limits.87 
Reforms need to be implemented to ensure that, in the case of conflicts 
of interest and executive compensation in particular, the interests of 
shareholders are adequately protected.  To do so requires two broad changes 
to existing fiduciary standards.  First, steps must be taken to ensure the 
efficacy of the process surrounding the approval of conflict of interest 
transactions, including executive compensation.  Second, fairness must 
again become part of the duty of loyalty. 
With respect to process, there are some modest changes that would 
improve but not fix the system.  The excessive pleading standards em-
ployed by the Delaware courts must be reduced.88  Allegations of friendship 
from national magazines89 or evidence of large payments to an organization 
employing the director90 ought to be enough to survive a motion to 
dismiss.91  Shareholders should be allowed to use discovery to uncover the 
true state of affairs.92 
The same should be true of informed decision-making.  Even modest 
evidence that the directors rushed the decision or lacked neutral advisors 
should allow shareholders to escape a motion to dismiss and obtain 
discovery. 
More importantly, the burden should be shifted to the board to show 
the presence of independent and informed decision-making.  After all, it is 
the board that is relying on proper process to obtain the protections of the 
business judgment rule.  This would significantly change the approach in 
the executive compensation area.  The board would need to show that the 
interested influence was excluded from the process.  Boards would almost 
 
87. See Brown, supra note 3, at 58 (noting that there is a theoretical limit: waste).  The 
standard for establishing waste is so difficult that it has no real bearing on compensation 
decisions.  Id. 
88. See id. at 85-93 (discussing excessive pleading standards employed by Delaware courts 
in derivative suits). 
89. See Beam v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1050 (Del. 2004) (evidence of friendship of 
director in part derived from interview in national magazine). 
90. See Brown, supra note 3, at 76-78 (discussing difficulty in showing that directors 
materially benefited from payments to an organization). 
91. See id. at 99 (“Moreover, the test for independence and the restrictive (indeed, in some 
cases, impossible) pleading standards all but ensures that these "independent" majorities will in at 
least some instances not be independent at all. The result is that the almost insurmountable 
presumption of the business judgment rule applies to transactions approved by interested boards. 
Therefore, in the context of the duty of loyalty, fairness no longer matters.”) (footnote omitted). 
92. Of course, the test for independence should be applied consistently.  To the extent 
looking to the materiality of a financial relationship with the company, there is no reason to 
exclude consideration of fees.  See Brown, supra note 3, at 72 (noting that Delaware courts do not 
apply materiality analysis to fees paid to directors).   
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certainly need to follow the special litigation committee model and rely on 
an approval process that involved independent directors with independent 
advisers.93  Directors with a conflict of interest would no longer be allowed 
to participate in the decision-making process.94 
The shift would also require the board to demonstrate that the decision 
was informed.95  In any subsequent litigation, it would be the board that 
would have to produce the consultant report, disclose any conflicts, and 
justify the informed and neutral nature of the advice.96  The burden would 
push boards to use compensation consultants who were free of conflicts of 
interest with the CEO or the company. 
These changes, however, would only go so far.  As the special litiga-
tion committee context has shown, courts can still make it difficult for 
shareholders to establish a lack of independence and informed decision-
making.  In other words, even with the benefit of discovery and a shift in 
the burden, there is no guarantee that the process will function properly to 
protect shareholders.   
The more radical change, therefore, needs to be an explicit return of 
fairness to the analysis.  No matter what procedures are employed, it is 
simply not possible to entirely insulate a board from the influence of the 
CEO or other interested directors.97  If for no other reason than directors 
know that they will have to interact together in the future, independent 
committees will always hesitate to take positions antagonistic to the CEO.98 
 
93. See In re Oracle Corp. Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 925-28 (Del. Ch. 2003) 
(discussing the stricter requirements imposed in connection with a special litigation committee).  
Stock exchange traded companies already must have compensation committees consisting entirely 
of independent directors.  See NYSE Rule 303A.05, available at http://www.nyse.com/ 
Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/1101074746736.html&display
Page=/lcm/lcm_subsection.html.  Delaware and the exchanges, however, do not use the same 
definition of “independent.”  See Brown, supra note 3, at 70.  Moreover, the exchanges do not 
exclude the CEO from participation or require neutral advisors.  See NYSE Rule 303A, available 
at http://www.nyse.com/Frameset.html?nyseref=http%3A//www.nyse.com/regulation/nyse/11010 
74746736.html&displayPage=/lcm/lcm_subsection.html. 
94. See Beam, 845 A.2d at 1055 (“Unlike the demand-excusal context, where the board is 
presumed to be independent, the SLC has the burden of establishing its own independence by a 
yardstick that must be ‘like Caesar’s wife’—above reproach.”). 
95. See Sutherland v. Sutherland, No. 2399-VCL, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 59, at *3 (Del. Ch. 
May 29, 2008) (finding the board had the burden of establishing reasonableness of process used 
by special litigation committee). 
96. See Gesoff v. IIC Indus., 902 A.2d 1130, 1147 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“As has been repeatedly 
held, special committee members should have access to knowledgeable and independent advisors, 
including legal and financial advisors.”). 
97. See Brown, supra note 3, at 56 (discussing impossibility of entirely excluding interested 
influence from decision making process on the board of directors); MACEY, supra note 5, at 59  
(labeling this “cognitive bias”). 
98. This is the fundamental point made by Jon Macey when he contends that boards have 
been “captured” by management.  See MACEY, supra note 5, at 51-68. 
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Recognizing this reality does not mean that special committees and 
independent approval mechanisms should be avoided.  Instead, they should 
be encouraged.  It does, however, make application of the duty of care an 
inappropriate standard for assessing the conflict of interest.  Independent 
approval of conflict of interest transactions should merely shift the burden 
of proof.  Rather than the board having to establish fairness, shareholders 
would have to show unfairness.  While this would be a tougher standard 
than the one traditionally applied to the duty of loyalty, it would continue to 
make the terms of the transaction relevant. 
In fact, the Delaware courts have done exactly this.  In conflict of 
interest transactions between the company and a controlling shareholder—
something that commonly arises in the context of parent/subsidiary 
merger—courts allow heightened process to alter the standard of review.99  
Rather than apply the business judgment rule, however, shareholders have 
the burden of showing the unfairness of the transaction.100  In other words, 
fairness and the terms of the transaction continue to matter. 
The same standard should be applied to all conflict of interest 
decisions, including compensation decisions.  The approach would likely 
increase the challenges to board approval of compensation decisions and 
other conflict of interest transactions.  As a practical matter, however, 
 
99. See In re LNR Prop. Corp. S’holders Litig., 896 A.2d 169, 177 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[T]he 
business judgment rule does not protect the board’s decision to approve a merger (even where a 
majority of the directors are independent and disinterested) where a controlling shareholder has a 
conflicting self-interest.”). 
100. See In re Cysive, Inc., S’holders Litig., 836 A.2d 531, 547 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Under that 
standard, the plaintiffs can succeed only if they show that the independent board majority or 
committee approval was somehow obtained by fraud or coercion on the part of Carbonell or Lund, 
or that the independent directors violated their duty of care or acted in bad faith.”); In re Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 9844, 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, at *20 (Del. Ch. Oct. 
21, 1988) (stating that approval by independent negotiating committee results in a “burden 
shifting effect” with respect to “the entire fairness of the transaction”).  This is true whether 
disinterested approval is by directors or shareholders.  See In re LNR, 896 A.2d at 178 n.52. 
While the initial burden of establishing entire fairness rests on the defendant party, an 
approval of the transaction by an independent and disinterested board or Special 
Committee, as well as an informed majority of minority vote, shifts the burden of 
proof on the issue of fairness to the challenging shareholder plaintiffs. 
Id.; see also Rosser v. New Valley Corp., No. 17272-NC, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, at *18 (Del. 
Ch. May 27, 2005). 
On the other hand, if implementation of the Plan is considered to be the result of 
actions taken by a controlling shareholder group, the effect of approval by fully 
informed and disinterested shareholders may simply be to shift to the Plaintiff the 
burden of demonstrating that the transaction was not entirely fair. 
Id. A recent Delaware court, however, suggested that the appropriate standard of review for a 
recommendation by a special committee might be an open question.  See Krasner v. Moffett, 826 
A.2d 277, 286 (Del. 2003) (“Beyond that, it is premature to determine the legal effect—and the 
resulting standard of review—that would apply if a special committee that operated independently 
recommended a merger to the full board.”). 
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shareholders would only have a realistic chance of successfully challenging 
compensation decisions that, like those in Julian and Valeant, were 
substantial in amount and not properly justified by the board. 
In other words, the standards would increase the risk of liability in a 
meaningful respect only for outliers, compensation decisions that exceeded 
all reasonable boundaries.  As a practical matter, this would force compen-
sation committees and boards to limit compensation to a more traditional 
and predictable range, tracking the practices of others in the same industry.  
It would result in a more cautious approach, bringing compensation 
decisions into greater alignment with the interests of shareholders. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The financial turmoil that began in fall of 2008 illustrated the out-of-
control nature of executive compensation.101  The federal government chose 
to remedy the situation by imposing relatively weak limitations on the 
compensation paid by the companies participating in the bailout.102  The 
provisions were notable for their efforts for the first time in setting federal 
standards for determining compensation.103  Nonetheless, they did little to 
alter the existing dynamic in the boardroom with respect to compensation 
decisions.104 
Similarly, the NDPTCA has not tampered with board duties.105  
Instead, the Act has sought to address the issue by including provisions that 
facilitate the election of directors nominated by shareholders.106  Ultimately, 
this may be the only real solution.  Legislative changes to fiduciary obliga-
tions will only work so well.  In places such as Delaware, any legislative 
 
101. See J. Robert Brown, Excessive Compensation and the Role of the Delaware Courts 
(Part 1), Nov. 21, 2008, available at http://www.theracetothebottom.org/executive-comp/ 
excessive-compensation-and-the-role-of-the-delaware-courts-p.html (discussing compensation 
paid to executives of financial firms and homebuilding firms over a five year period); see also J. 
Robert Brown, Corporate Governance Failures and the Bailout Bill, Oct. 22, 2008, 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/corporate-governance-failures-and-the-
bailout-bill.html (describing limits on executive compensation in financial bailout legislation). 
102. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. (2008) 
(enacted); 110 P.L. 343; 122 Stat. 3765. 
103. See J. Robert Brown, Corporate Governance, the Bailout and a Lost Opportunity 
(Part 2), Oct. 6, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/securities-issues/corporate-governance-
the-bailout-and-a-lost-opportunity-part-1.html (describing the limited nature of executive 
compensation reforms in financial bailout legislation).  Until these provisions, federal efforts to 
reign in executive compensation had been limited to changes in the tax treatment of payments 
rather than efforts to directly affect the amounts involved.  See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m) (2008). 
104. See J. Robert Brown, Delaware Courts and the Influence of Federal Preemption 
(Part 1), Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/ 
delaware-courts-and-the-influence-of-federal-preemption-part-1.html. 
105. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text. 
106. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. 
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change would still have to confront the pro-management bias of the 
courts.107  Probably the only way to truly protect the interests of share-
holders is to give them the authority to elect their own candidates to the 
board.108  This would not only insert shareholder advocates into the board-
room, but also focus the attention of the other directors on shareholder 
interests as a means of avoiding a proxy fight. 
Nonetheless, this is a long-term solution.  The hostility and antagonism 
to the SEC’s modest proposal to provide large shareholders of public 
companies access to the company’s proxy statement, a right provided under 
the NDPTCA, show that changes to the composition of the boardroom will 
not happen anytime soon.109  Short term fixes to the board’s fiduciary duties 
through additional, affirmative obligations and increasing the risk of 
liability are the only meaningful ways to begin the process of limiting 
executive compensation and protecting the interests of shareholders.110 
 
 
107. See J. Robert Brown, Delaware, the Courts, and the Race to the Bottom, Mar. 12, 2008, 
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/preemption-of-delaware-law/delaware-the-courts-and-the-
race-to-the-bottom.html (discussing non-legal reasons why Delaware benefits from companies 
incorporating in state); see also J. Robert Brown, Delaware Judges, Shareholder Rights, and the 
Appearance of Bias (Part 5), Mar. 11, 2008, http://www.theracetothebottom .org/preemption-of-
delaware-law/delaware-judges-shareholder-rights-and-the-appearance-of-bia-4.html (discussing 
views of a Vice Chancellor of the Delaware Chancery Court on corporate governance issues). 
108. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The SEC, Corporate Governance, and Shareholder Access to the 
Board Room, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1339, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095032. 
109. Id. at 1380 n. 224. 
110. Even for those recognizing the problem of board capture, this is not the only solution.  
Jon Macey at Yale sees the solution as an increase in takeovers.  See MACEY, supra note 5, at 51-
68. 
